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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal by appellee/plaintiff Machelle Canfield ("Ms. Canfield") 
from the trial court's ruling on appellee/defendant Layton City's (the "City") Rule 
26(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.1 Jurisdiction 
over this appeal is pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
(1) Issue: Did the trial court properly grant the City's motion to dismiss 
where it is undisputed that Ms. Canfield failed to file the required Notice of Claim 
pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1, et. 
seq (the "Act") and: (1) Ms. Canfield's Complaint, on its face, fails to allege a 
contract claim or any type of contractual obligation that might excuse her from the 
Act's notice requirements; (2) Ms. Canfield failed to meet her burden of providing 
the trial court with evidence of any contractual obligation sufficient to establish 
subject matter jurisdiction; and/or (3) Ms. Canfield's claims are grounded in 
statute, not contract? 
Standard of Review: "Compliance with the [Governmental] 
Immunity Act is a prerequisite to vesting a district court with subject matter 
jurisdiction over claims against governmental entities." Wheeler v. McPherson, 
'Ms. Canfield incorrectly states the City's motion is under Rule 12(b)(6). 
1 
2002 UT 16, f 9, 40 P.3d 632 (citations omitted). Whether subject matter 
jurisdiction exists is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Beaver County v. 
Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, If 8, 31 P.23d 1147; Housing Auth. of County of Salt 
Lake v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28, f 10, 44 P.3d 724. 
Preservation of Issue: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction need not 
be preserved in the trial court, and may be raised at any time. Horn v. Utah Dep 't 
of Pub. Safety, 962 P.2d 95, 99 (Utah 1998); Snyder, 2002 UT 28, ^ 11, 44 P.3d 
724; Nielsen v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130, 134 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). This issue, 
however, was preserved below in the City's motion to dismiss and supporting 
memorandum, in Ms. Canfield's opposition to that motion, and in the trial court's 
Order granting the City's motion. See R. 6-8, 9-24,25-27, 28-52, 53-54. 
(2) Issue: Is this lawsuit subject to dismissal on grounds of res judicata 
where essentially the same complaint was previously dismissed by the federal 
court in Canfieldv. Layton City, Case No. 1:02CV41 (N.D. Utah), based on Ms. 
Canfield's failure to comply with the court's order to amend her complaint, which 
dismissal is an adjudication on the merits pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(2)(b)? 
Standard of Review: Whether claims are barred by res judicata is a 
question of law. Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, f 20, 70 P.3d 1. x 
2 
Preservation of Issue: Ms. Canfield raised the issue of res judicata in 
her opposing memorandum to the City's motion to dismiss, by referring to the 
federal court's dismissal of the same Complaint that was subsequently filed in this 
lawsuit. See R. 28-35, at R. 30-31. Before the City could file a reply, the trial 
court granted the City's motion. The City also would have raised res judicata as 
an affirmative defense in its Answer. Regardless, an appellate court can affirm on 
any grounds, even one not relied upon by the trial court. Hall v. Utah State Dep V 
of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, f 21, 24 P.3d 958 (citations omitted). All documents 
relied on by Layton City for its res judicata defense are part of the public record of 
Ms. Canfield's claims and, thus, are subject to judicial notice.2 These public 
records are included for the Court's convenience in the Addendum to this brief. 
(3) Issue: Do Utah courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over Ms. 
Canfield's claims due to her failure to exhaust administrative remedies? 
2
 A court may take judicial notice of public records and court filings in other 
cases. Moore's Federal Practice ^fl2.34[2]. Such records "[are] not viewed as 
scrutiny of evidence . . . since facts capable of judicial notice are recorded in 
sources whose accuracy is not subject to reasonable question." Id. ^[56.30[3][c], 
Thus, even in Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, a court may take judicial notice of 
matters of public records outside the pleadings without converting the 12(b)(6) 
motion to one for summary judgment. Id. ^ 56.30[4]. Accord, GFF Corp. v. 
Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir. 1997). 
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Standard of Review: Whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a 
question of law. Beaver County, 2001 UT 81, p , 31 P.23d 1147; Snyder, 2002 
UT28,1|l0,44P.3d724. 
Preservation of Issue: Issues regarding subject matter jurisdiction 
need not be preserved in the trial court, and can be raised at any time. Horn, 962 
P.2d at 99; Snyder, 2002 UT 28, f 11, 44 P.3d 724; Nielsen, 888 P.2d at 134. 
III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following rules and statutes are determinative of this appeal: 
The governing body of each municipality shall prescribe rules and 
regulations which are not inconsistent with the laws of this state, as it 
deems best for the efficient administration, organization, operation, 
conduct and business of the municipality. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-815. (Utah Municipal Code; Rules and Regulations for 
Administration of Municipality). 
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules 
or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an 
action or of any claim against the defendant. Unless the court in its 
order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this 
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to 
join a party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication on the merits. 
Fed.R.Civ.P.41(2)(b). 
4 
Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, 
or against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the 
performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under the color of authority shall file a written notice 
of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, regardless of 
whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2). (Governmental Immunity Act). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises from a lawsuit filed by Ms. Canfield in state court on or 
about November 25, 2002, Case No. 020700620. The history of Ms. Canfield's 
claims is more extensive, however, and includes a November 18, 2002 dismissal 
by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Utah, of essentially 
the same Complaint that is the subject of this lawsuit. 
A. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following allegations are taken from Ms. Canfield's Complaint: 
Ms. Canfield's claims arise out of her employment by Layton City as a 
police dispatcher. R. 1-5. She alleges that a new supervisor in the dispatch area 
where she worked "unfairly and unjustly scrutinized [her] work performance" and 
her use of sick leave, and that she felt the supervisor's request that she provide 
medical documentation was "an improper deviation from existing City policy." R. 
5 
2-3. She contends that when "officers, employees, agents or servants of [Layton 
City] confronted [her] with the allegation that [she] had misused sick leave," she 
resigned her employment on June 2, 2001. R. 9; see also R. 21 (Ms. Canfield's 
resignation letter). 
Ms. Canfield alleges that she resigned because she was confronted with the 
"ultimatum" of either resigning or facing termination, and because she feared that 
"a termination would preclude her from gaining future gainful employment." R. 4. 
She alleges that: (1) other employees "have not been punished as severely as she 
has, have not been terminated, or not given an ultimatum, but instead, were given 
employee warnings, probation, and other punishment," (2) that her alleged 
punishment, including her alleged termination, "was disproportionate to the acts 
alleged," and (3) that she "has been treated differently from and more severely 
than other employees of Defendant, all in contravention of Defendant's specific 
written policy." R. 4-5. She also alleges that "Defendant's personnel policy 
specifically requires that plaintiff be treated fairly and that any punishments or 
discipline given to her be proportionate to the offense alleged." Her Complaint 
asks for "damages in an amount to be proven at trial." R. 5. 
6 
B. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. AND 
PRIOR DISPOSITION 
1. FEDERAL LAWSUIT 
The procedural history of this lawsuit begins on or about March 18,2002, 
when Ms. Canfield filed an Amended Complaint3 in the Second Judicial District 
Court for Davis County. See Canfield v. Layton City (Case No. 020800412), 
attached in Aplee Add., as Ex. 1. This Amended Complaint is word for word 
identical to the Complaint filed herein, except that the Complaint here has added \ 
12.4 Compare id. with Aplt Add., Ex. B. 
Layton City removed this initial state lawsuit to federal court and filed an 
Answer. See Answer, Case No. 1:02CV00041 (N.D. Utah), attached in Aplee 
Add., as Ex. 2. The basis for removal was the City's belief that the Amended 
Complaint asserted an equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, over which 
3The original complaint was filed March 14, 2002. 
"This added f 12 merely states as follows: "Prior to these incidents, in 
December, 2000, after being Plaintiffs supervisor for only a few weeks, Lisa 
Murdock demanded that Plaintiff provide medical documentation of sick leave 
used at that time. Plaintiff did not provide said documentation, although she had 
it, because she felt that it was an improper deviation from existing City policy." 
The City submits that this additional allegation does not materially alter the 
substance or gravamen of her Complaint here from Ms. Canfield's amended 
complaint in the federal lawsuit. 
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the federal court would have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See 
Notice of Removal, Aplee Add., Ex. 3. Ms. Canfield did not object to removal. 
At a subsequent scheduling conference, the Honorable Ronald N. Boyce, 
United States Magistrate Judge, commented that it was unclear what claim Ms. 
Canfield was asserting. Ms. Canfield's attorney then stated that there was no 
equal protection claim, and that Ms. Canfield was asserting a "disparate treatment" 
claim under City policies. See Def s Mem. Supp. Mot. Req. Am. Compl. 
(Aug. 26, 2002), Aplee Add., Ex. 4. 
Based on Magistrate Judge Boyce's comment, on August 22, 2002, the 
Honorable Dale Kimball, United States District Judge, who was presiding over the 
federal lawsuit, issued an Order to Show Cause which stated: 
The above-entitled matter was removed from state court on 
defendant's contention that plaintiff was asserting a claim under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff did not allege such a claim and at 
pretrial before the magistrate judge plaintiffs counsel asserted there 
was no equal protection claim being pursued. Therefore, the case 
involves only state issues of violation of plaintiff s rights under 
Layton City's civil service standards. 
See Order to Show Cause, Aplee Add., Ex. 5. Judge Kimball ordered the parties to 
show cause on or before September 28, 2002, why the lawsuit should not be 
remanded to state court. See id 
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On August 26, 2002, the City filed a motion to require Ms. Canfield to file 
an amended complaint that specifically identified any cause of action which she 
was asserting against the City. See Defs' Mot. Req. Am. Compl. (Aug. 26, 2002), 
Aplee Add., Ex. 6. 
Ms. Canfield never responded to the City's motion and she did not file any 
amended complaint clarifying the nature of her claims against the City. Instead, 
on September 20, 2002, her attorney sent a letter to the City's attorneys providing 
them with a "more definitive statement as to what my client's claims are." See 
Letter from Brad Smith to Camille N. Johnson, attached as Ex. B to Defs' Resp. to 
Order to Show Cause, Aplee Add., Ex. 7. The letter states that Ms. Canfield is not 
asserting an equal protection claim, and that her claim "is one for constructive 
termination on the basis that Layton City failed to follow its own termination 
policy and deprived Ms. Canfield of her job without due process of law." See id. 
The letter goes on to state that Ms. Canfiled's claim would "implicate Federal 
Fourteenth Amendment case law." Id. 
On September 25, 2002, the City filed a response to the Order to Show 
Cause, and attached a copy of Mr. Smith's September 20, 2002 letter. See Defs' 
Resp. to Order to Show Cause, Aplee Add., Ex. 7. In this response, the City 
referred the court to Mr. Smith's letter and stated that "plaintiffs attorney has 
9 
identified his client's claim as one for deprivation of due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." See id., p. 4. Based on 
this letter, the City asked the federal court to retain jurisdiction of the lawsuit and 
to grant the City's motion requiring Ms. Canfield to amend her complaint. Id. 
Ms. Canfield never filed a response to the federal court's Order to Show 
Cause, and never responded or objected to the City's statement to the court that 
Ms. Canfield had informed the City that her claim was a due process claim under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Ms. Canfield also failed to respond to the City's 
motion that she amend her complaint. On October 1, 2002, the federal court 
granted the City's motion requiring Ms. Canfield to amend her complaint, and 
ordered her to do so within 30 days. See Order, Aplee Add., Ex. 8. 
Ms. Canfield did not file a second amended complaint as required by the 
federal court's October 1, 2002 Order. Accordingly, on November 15, 2003, the 
City filed a motion to dismiss based on Ms. Canfield's failure to comply with the 
court's Order. See Motion to Dismiss & Supp. Mem, Aplee Add., Ex. 9. On 
November 18, 2002, Judge Kimball dismissed Ms. Canfield's lawsuit due to her 
failure to comply with the court's Order. Order, Aplee Add., Ex. 10. 
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2. SUBSEQUENT STATE LAWSUIT 
On November 25, 2002, one week after Judge Kimball dismissed her federal 
court lawsuit, Ms. Canfield filed her Complaint in this lawsuit. As discussed 
above, her Complaint here was virtually identical to her Amended Complaint 
which had been dismissed by Judge Kimball. 
Layton City did not answer the Complaint and, on December 23, 2002, filed 
a Motion to Dismiss under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), based on Ms. 
Canfield's failure to file a Notice of Claim. R. 6-7, 9-24. On January 17, 2003, 
Ms. Canfield filed a response to the Motion to Dismiss, where she admitted that 
she had not filed a Notice of Claim (R. 30), and contended that her "complaint 
alleges a constructive termination and violation of Layton City's written 
employment rules including rules regarding the proportionality of employee 
discipline, rules relating to consistency among termination, and related matters" 
(R. 31). She argued that her Complaint "sounds in contract."5 R. 31. She further 
contended that she had employment "with a reasonable expectation of its 
continuance" and that "[t]here were various policies and procedures in place for 
5This assertion is, of course, contrary to Ms. Canfield's attorney's prior 
representation that his client's complaint claim asserted a Fourteenth Amendment 
due process claim. See Ex. B to Aplee Add., Ex. 7. 
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termination and discipline.' R. 32. She cited to the federal lawsuit and 
incorrectly asserted that the federal lawsuit was dismissed "on the basis that there 
was no federal jurisdiction." R. 30-31. Ms. Canfield did not provide the trial 
court with a copy of any "policies and procedures" on which she relied for her 
assertion that her claims sounded in "contract," nor did she cite to any specific 
City policies or procedures which she claims were breached by the City.7 
The City had no opportunity to file a reply memorandum in support of its 
Motion to Dismiss because prior to its due date, the state trial court contacted the 
City's attorneys and informed them that the court would grant the City's Motion. 
On February 19, 2003, the state trial court filed its Order granting the City's 
Motion to Dismiss. R. 53-54. On March 12, 2003, Ms. Canfield timely filed a 
notice of appeal (R. 56), and this appeal ensued. 
6Ms. Canfield stated in her response that her "prayer for relief includes a 
prayer for contract damages with no reference to tort type damages whatsoever." 
R. 33. In reality, Ms. Canfield's signed and notarized response to the City's 
interrogatories in the federal lawsuit state that she is seeking "general damages for 
suffering and humiliation," which are tort damages, not contract damages. See 
PL's Resp. to Def s Interrog. No. 3, attached as Ex. 11 in Aplee Add. 
7Attaching evidence to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion does not convert the motion 
into one for summary judgment. Spoons v. Lewis, 1999 UT 82, | 5, 987 P.2d 36. 
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V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of Ms. Canfield's 
lawsuit for the following reasons. First, it is undisputed that Ms. Canfield failed to 
file a Notice of Claim pursuant to the Act. Ms. Canfield asserts that she was not 
required to comply with the notice requirements of the Act because her Complaint 
asserts a contract claim. To the contrary, her Complaint on its face fails to identify 
any "contract" or "contractual obligation," much less a breach of any contract. 
Ms. Canfield also did not meet her burden below to establish facts sufficient to 
show subject matter jurisdiction, because she failed to provide the trial court with 
any evidence of a contractual obligation. 
Regardless, Ms. Canfield's claims are grounded in statute, not contract, 
because they arose out of the Legislature's mandate that municipalities enact rules 
and regulations as they "deem best" to govern their operations. The City's internal 
discipline and/or termination grievance procedures fall within this statutory grant. 
In addition, the Utah Court of Appeals has recognized that public employers 
promulgate rules and regulations pursuant to statute and not from contract. 
Second, this lawsuit is properly dismissed on grounds of res judicata or 
claim preclusion because not only are the parties and Complaint the same as those 
in the previous federal lawsuit, but the federal court's dismissal of Ms. Canfield's 
13 
lawsuit, based on her failure to comply with the court's order, constitutes a 
dismissal on the merits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 
Third, dismissal of this lawsuit should be affirmed because this Court and 
the trial court lack subject matter jurisdiction due to Ms. Canfield's failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies by pursuing a grievance or appeal with the City. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
Ms. Canfield's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in 
dismissing her lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because her claim 
"sounds in contract" and, thus, she was not subject to the notice requirements of 
the Act. This argument is without merit for the reasons discussed below. 
A. MS. CANFIELD'S COMPLAINT FAILS TO ASSERT A 
"CONTRACT"CLAIM 
Utah law mandates strict compliance with the requirements of the Act, 
which applies to claims brought against a governmental entity for money or 
damages. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to -38. Under the Act, a claim against a 
political subdivision is barred unless a notice of claim is filed with the governing 
body of the political subdivision within one year after the claim arises.8 Id. § 63-
8The purpose of a notice of claim '"is to require every claimant to clearly 
state all of the elements of his claim to the city council'" and to "afford the 
political subdivision an opportunity to investigate the claim while the matter is of 
recent memory, witnesses are yet available, conditions have not materially 
14 
30-11 and -13; Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth, 618 P.2d 480,481 (Utah 1980). 
Compliance with the notice provisions of the Act is a condition precedent to 
maintaining suit {Hall v. Utah State Dep't of Corrections, 2001 UT, ^  23, 24 P.2d 
958), and the burden of filing a notice of claim rests entirely with the plaintiff (see 
Shunkv. State, 924 P.2d 879, 882 (Utah 1996)). The requirements of the Act must 
be strictly complied with or dismissal of the action is mandated (Hall, 2001 UT 
34, f 23, 24 P.3d 958), and failure to comply precisely with notice requirements 
deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction (Greene v. Utah Transit Auth., 2001 
UT 109,U 16, 24 P.3d 1156). 
Based on these standards, the trial court properly dismissed Ms. Canfield's 
Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. First, the Complaint on its face 
fails to assert a contract claim. While Ms. Canfield now claims that her 
"complaint sounds in contract" and that "[a] contract claim could not be more 
clearly stated" (Appellant's Brief at 6), the City begs to differ. A review of the 
complaint reveals that the gravamen of Ms. Canfield's claim is that she was 
treated differently from other employees. Significantly, the word "contract" never 
appears in the Complaint, nor does she allege either the elements of a contract or 
changed and to determine if there is liability, and if there is, the extent of it." Hall, 
2001 UT 34, \ 23, 24 P.3d 958 (citation omitted); see also Larson v. Park City 
Mun. Corp., 955 P.2d 343, 345-46 (Utah 1998). 
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the elements of a breach of contract claim. Ms. Canfield fails to identify any 
specific contract or contractual provision which gives rise to her claim. At most, 
the Complaint generally alludes to "City policy" (R. 12), "Defendant's specific 
written policy" (R. 4), and "personnel policy" (R. 4). These general references do 
not give rise to a contract claim.9 Moreover, in opposing the City's Motion to 
Dismiss, Ms. Canfield also failed to provide the trial court with evidence of (or 
citation of language from) a "contract," and relied solely on argument. 
Second, since "4[s]ubject matter jurisdiction [implicates] the authority of the 
court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it," 
"
4[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever 
and however raised.'" Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. City of New London, 
829 A.2d 801, 806 & 806 n.12 (Conn. 2003) (citation omitted); accord, Bazemore 
v. Colorado State Lottery Div., 64 P.3d 876, 878 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003)(citation 
omitted). However, as discussed above, Ms. Canfield failed to meet this burden in 
opposing the City's motion to dismiss. Ms. Canfield did not refer the Court to, or 
Significantly, the City's Policy Manual states that "[t]he policies and 
statements contained in this manual and in other statements that may be issued 
from time to time, do not create a contract or agreement of any kind between the 
City and its employees." See Layton City Policy Manual, Ex. 12 in Aplee Add. 
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cite, any specific City policy in support of her argument that her claim sounded in 
contract. Thus, the trial court's dismissal of the Complaint was proper.10 
Third, although Ms. Canfield's explanations of the nature of her claim have 
varied, there is no merit to her contention that her claims sound in contract. As a 
matter of law, Ms. Canfield's lawsuit is grounded in statute, not contract. Utah 
statutory law specifically authorizes municipalities to prescribe rules and 
regulations as they "deem best" to efficiently operate the municipality and its 
operations: 
The governing body of each municipality shall prescribe rules and 
regulations which are not inconsistent with the laws of this state, as it 
deems best for the efficient administration, organization, operation, 
conduct and business of the municipality. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-815. 
Layton City has adopted such operational policies, including procedures 
related to termination and/or discipline of its employees, which accordingly are 
10The Court should disregard Ms. Canfield's criticism of the trial court for 
allegedly failing to "engage in a clear, deliberative analysis to categorize, analyze, 
and determine governmental immunity claims." Aplt Br., p. 8. She makes this 
argument even though she herself failed to raise an alleged "proper analytical 
framework" argument in the trial court. See R. 31-36. Even if Ms. Canfieldhad 
raised this argument, it is irrelevant because subject matter jurisdiction can be 
raised at any time and issues regarding subject matter jurisdiction need not be 
preserved in the trial court. See Snyder, 2002 UT 28, f 11,44 P.3d 724; Nielsen, 
888P.2datl34. 
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grounded in statute. For example, in Knight v. Salt Lake County, 2002 UT App. 
100, 46 P.3d 247, the trial court ruled there was no contract in a situation where 
public employees' were employed pursuant to the County Personnel Management 
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-33-1 to -15. Id. at f4 . This Court affirmed, finding 
that any alleged rights were statutory, not contractual. Id. at ffl[ 7-9. 
In making this ruling, this Court commented that "public employees' 
employment rights generally spring not from contract, but from legislative policy," 
(Id. at 18), and cited as persuasive the following statement by the Kansas Supreme 
Court regarding the lack of analogy between public and private employees: 
"There neither is, not can be, an analogy of statuses between public 
employees and private employees, in fact or law, because of the 
inherent differences in the employment relationship arising out of the 
unique fact that the public employer was established by and is run for 
the benefit of all the people and its authority derives not from 
contract nor the profit motive inherent in the principle of free private 
enterprise, but from the constitution, statutes, civil service rules, 
regulations and resolutions." 
Id. at f 8 n.7 (quoting Wright v. Kansas Water Office, 881 P.2d 567, 571 (Kan. 
1994)) (emphasis in original). As additional support for the contract/statute 
distinction, Knight cited Weese v. Davis County Commission, 834 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 
1992), as stating that "[t]he county only has those rights and powers granted it by 
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the Utah Constitution and statutes or those implied as a necessary means to 
accomplish them." Id. at \ 8 n.7. 
Based on these standards and based on the grant of authority to 
municipalities in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-815, any alleged rights of the City's 
employees are statutory and not contractual. Accordingly, the Act required Ms. 
Canfield to file a notice of claim before bringing this lawsuit.11 
Finally, contrary to the assertions in her brief, Ms. Canfield has failed to cite 
any Utah case law that would support her "contract" argument. For example, her 
citation to Neel v. State, 854 P.2d 581 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) is misplaced because 
that case deals with a specific Utah statute that states that an action to obtain PIP 
uThere is also no merit to Ms. Canfield's argument that the Act should be 
liberally construed in her case. Ms. Canfield cites Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 as 
support for this argument. However, the Act deals with sovereign immunity, and 
not with common law claims, whereas § 68-3-2 addresses common law causes of 
action. Moreover, Utah courts have never construed the Act "liberally" {see, e.g., 
Wheeler, 2002 UT 16, \ 11, 40 P.3d 632), and may not accept at face value any 
arguments that a plaintiff may make so as to avoid the implications of the Act {see, 
e.g., Tiede v. State of Utah, 915 P.2d 500 (Utah 1996); Wright v. University of 
Utah, 876 P.2d 380, 383 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). Likewise, Ms. Canfield's 
argument regarding an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim is 
also misplaced, because the Complaint on its face makes no such claim. 
Regardless, there must be a contract for there to be such an implied covenant and, 
as discussed above, the basis for the subject claim is statutory not contractual. 
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benefits is contractual. Id. at 583. Nor does Farmers New World Life Insurance 
Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990), support her position. The 
"contract" there was a right-of-way agreement entered into by Bountiful City and 
Farmers Insurance, which the City did not sign but which it accepted and used, 
and for which "valuable consideration" was transferred. Id. 803 P.2d at 1248. 
Based on these facts, the court found that the contractual obligation waiver in the 
Act applied because a contract had been formed. Id. Significantly, Ms. Canfield 
has failed to point to any agreement, acceptance, or consideration, and has not 
provided this Court or the trial court with the "contract" on which she relies.13 
Similarly, the case law from other jurisdictions cited by Ms. Canfield is 
inapplicable. For example, Camas Colorado, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 
12The basis for plaintiffs claims in Neel was Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-
309(5) which expressly stated that "If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when 
due , . . . [t]he person entitled to the benefits may bring an action in contract to 
recover the expenses." Neel, 854 P.2d at 583 (quoting statute). 
]3Broadbent v. Board of Education, 910 P.2d 1274 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), 
also fails to support the "contract" argument. The plaintiff there alleged 
termination in violation of public policy. Id. at 1276. The court found that this 
claim sounded in tort, not contract, and defendant had not waived immunity for 
this type of tort claim. Id. at 1277. 
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36 P.3d 135 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001), involved a specific written contract between 
the County and the plaintiff/contractor.14 Id. at 137. 
B. THIS LAWSUIT IS PROPERLY DISMISSED ON GROUNDS OF 
RES JUDICATA. 
In Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that claim preclusion bars a lawsuit if: (1) the prior and present lawsuit 
involve the same parties or their privies, (2) the claim alleged to be barred was 
presented in the first lawsuit or could and should have been raised, and (3) the first 
14Other cases cited by Ms. Canfield are also inapposite. See Paquette v. 
County of Durham, 573 S.E.2d 715 (N.C. Ct. App.) (claim for unpaid back wages 
for overtime worked); Harris v. State Personnel Bd., 216 Cal. Rptr. 274 (Ct. App. 
1985) (mandamus claim for unpaid back wages; employee had exhausted all 
administrative remedies); Karpierz v. Easley, 31 S. W.3d 505 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) 
(civil forfeiture case seeking return of monies seized); Garcia v. Middle Rio 
Grande Conservancy Dist, 918 P.2d 7 (N.M. 1996) (no discussion of notice of 
claim; no evidence that employer's manual stated it was not a contract); Tennyson 
v. School Dist. ofMenomenieArea, 606 N.W.2d 594 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (written 
policy guaranteed employees they would not be discharged without cause); Koenig 
v. City ofS. Haven, 597 N.W.2d 99 (Mich. 1999) (involving third-party 
beneficiary to memorandum of understanding between City and Army Corp. of 
Engineers); CNXTransp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, 325 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 
2003) (City admits contract between City and railroad does not sound in tort); J. P. 
Asset Co. v. City of Wichita, 70 P.3d 711 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003) (no discussion of 
contract or governmental immunity); Stewart ex rel. Womack v. City of Jackson, 
804 So.2d 1041 (Miss. 2002) (third-party beneficiary of express written contract 
between city agency and University of Mississippi Medical Center). 
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lawsuit resulted in a final judgment on the merits. Id. at 247; see also Maoris & 
Assoc, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, f 20, 16 P.3d 1214.15 
In this case, each of the three elements of claim preclusion are satisfied. 
First, the parties in the prior federal lawsuit are identical to the parties in this 
lawsuit. Second, it is obvious that the claim presented in the prior federal lawsuit 
is the same claim presented in this lawsuit because the underlying complaints in 
the two lawsuits are essentially identical. Third, the dismissal of the prior federal 
lawsuit constitutes a final judgment on the merits. Specifically, there was an 
adjudication on the merits because the federal lawsuit was dismissed based on Ms. 
Canfield's failure to comply with the federal court's Order. See, e.g., Henderson 
v. Consolidated Merck Corp., 286 F. Supp. 697, 698 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (dismissal 
due to failure to comply with court's order is adjudication on the merits under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 41). Accordingly, this lawsuit is barred by res judicata, and is 
properly dismissed. 
Although Ms. Canfield admits that the federal court dismissed virtually the 
same complaint that she filed in this lawsuit, she has mistakenly informed both 
15Significantly, the Court also pointed out that Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
Rule 41, which is substantially the same as the federal rule, definitively operates 
as an adjudication on the merits unless a dismissal was for lack of jurisdiction, 
improper venue, or lack of an indispensable party. Madsen, 769 P.2d at 248. 
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this Court and the trial court that the dismissal was for lack of federal subject 
matter jurisdiction. See Aplt Br. p. 3.; R. 30-31. However, the record shows that 
the federal court dismissed Ms. Canfield's lawsuit because she failed to comply 
with the court's direct order that she file a second amended complaint to state her 
claim(s) specifically. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41, dismissal for 
failure to comply with a court order operates as an adjudication on the merits: 
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules 
or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an 
action or of any claim against the defendant. Unless the court in its 
order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this 
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to 
join a party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication on the merits. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(2)(b). 
Filings in the federal district court show that, after the court issued an Order 
to Show Cause why the lawsuit should not be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, 
Ms. Canfield informed the City's attorneys that her claim was one for due process 
and implicated the Fourteenth Amendment. See Part IV(B)(1) supra, discussing 
the federal lawsuit. Ms. Canfield never filed a response to the federal court's 
Order to Show Cause, never responded or objected when the City submitted to the 
federal court the letter in which she admitted that her claim was one for due 
process implicating the Fourteenth Amendment, and never responded or objected 
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when the City informed the federal court that Ms. Canfield had stated that her 
claim was a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. 
Significantly, the federal court did not follow through on its Order to Show 
Cause by dismissing the lawsuit at that time. Instead, the Federal court retained 
jurisdiction of the lawsuit and, on October 1, 2002, it granted the City's motion 
requesting that Ms. Canfield be ordered to amend her Complaint, and gave Ms. 
Canfield thirty days in which to do so.16 See Order, Aplee Add., Ex. 8. 
Ms. Canfield did not amend her complaint as required by the federal court's 
October 1, 2002 Order and, on November 15, 2003, the City filed a motion to 
dismiss based on her failure to comply with this court order. See Aplee Add., 
Ex. 9. On November 18, 2002, Judge Kimball dismissed Ms. Canfield's lawsuit 
due to her failure to comply with the court's October 1, 2002 Order. See Order, 
Aplee Add., Ex. 10. 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Ms. Canfield's lawsuit was dismissed 
due to her failure to comply with the court's order to file a second amended 
complaint, and not because of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the 
16The federal court's Order was clearly based on the City's response to the 
Order to Show Cause wherein it had notified the court of Ms. Canfield's 
admission that she was asserting a claim that implicated the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
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federal court's dismissal of Ms. Canfield's prior lawsuit was a dismissal on the 
merits and, as a result, this lawsuit is barred by claim preclusion under the doctrine 
of res judicata. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT AND THIS COURT LACK SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION BECAUSE MS. CANFIELD FAILED TO EXHAUST 
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. 
Although Ms. Canfield admitted to the trial court that she resigned her 
employment (R. 29),17 she contends in her appellate brief that she was treated 
differently than other City employees with regard to sick leave, and was 
constructively terminated.18 In light of this contention, this lawsuit should be 
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to Ms. Canfield's failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies. 
Utah law makes clear that courts lack subject matter jurisdiction when a 
plaintiff fails to exhaust administrative procedures or remedies. For example, in 
l7The Complaint states that "[bjecause of her fear that a termination would 
preclude her from gaining future gainful employment, Plaintiff reluctantly and 
against her will accepted termination." R. 4. In her memorandum opposing the 
City's Motion to Dismiss, Ms. Canfield stated that she "admits that she resigned 
her employment under the circumstances detailed in her complaint." R. 29-30. 
18Based on the allegations in her Complaint, Ms. Canfield was not 
constructively terminated. '"If an employee resigns of her own free will, even as a 
result of the employer's actions, that employee will not be held to have been 
constructively discharged.'" Heno v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 208 F.3d 847, 858 
(10th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 
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Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7, 67 P.3d. 466, the Court dismissed 
claims brought by a real estate developer because the developer failed to exhaust 
administrative remedies under Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(1). Id. ffif 14-16. 
Patterson recognized that § 10-9-1001 authorizes municipalities to adopt 
administrative procedures to govern land use decisions, and that American Fork 
City had done so in its Development Code. Id. \ 16. The Utah Supreme Court 
accordingly found that the developer's failure to exhaust these procedures resulted 
in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. \ 17; see also id. f|[ 18-19 (discussing 
failure to exhaust remedies). 
In this case, Ms. Canfield has also failed to exhaust administrative remedies. 
Utah statutory law gives municipalities the authority to prescribe policies and 
procedures to govern their efficient operation as the municipalities "deem best/' 
so long as the policies and procedures do not conflict with laws of the state. Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-3-815. The City has done so by establishing procedures for 
employees to present grievances and object to disciplinary actions, performance 
evaluations, and termination, including an appeals process. See Layton City 
Policies and Procedures, attached as Ex. 13 to Aplee App. 
Although Ms. Canfield contends she was constructively terminated and 
treated differently with regard to the City's policies and procedures, she fails to 
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allege that she has been denied access to a grievance/appeals procedure, and 
indeed she has not. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Ms. Canfield 
ever attempted to avail herself of the City's available grievance/appeals procedure 
and, in fact, it is undisputed that she did not do so. In light of the Legislature's 
broad grant of authority to municipalities to regulate "operations" as the 
municipality "deems best," Ms. Canfield was required to pursue these internal 
remedies before bringing a lawsuit. 
The fact that the exhaustion requirement applies to internal grievance and 
termination procedures of governmental entities is illustrated in numerous cases. 
For example, in Long v. Samson, 568 N.W.2d 602 (N.D. 1997), the North Dakota 
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction of contract and tort claims by a professor who was formerly employed 
by the University of North Dakota. Id. at 606. In affirming, the court agreed with 
the trial court that the professor had failed to exhaust internal administrative 
remedies set forth in a Faculty Handbook. Id. at 603-604. As justification for the 
exhaustion requirement, the court pointed to the following language in a prior 
decision involving a doctor who failed to exhaust administrative remedies at the 
hospital where she was employed: 
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" . . . an exhaustion of remedies requirement serves the salutary 
function of eliminating or mitigating damages. If an organization is 
given the opportunity quickly to determine through the operation of 
its internal procedures that it has committed error, it may be able to 
minimize, and sometimes eliminate, any monetary injury to the 
plaintiff by immediately reversing its initial decision and affording 
the aggrieved party all membership rights; an individual should not 
be permitted to increase damages by foregoing available internal 
remedies Moreover, by insisting upon exhaustion even in these 
circumstances, courts accord recognition to the 'expertise' of the 
organization's quasi-judicial tribunal, permitting it to adjudicate the 
merits of plaintiff s claim in the first instance Finally, even if the 
absence of an internal damage remedy makes ultimate resort to the 
courts inevitable ... the prior judicial efficiency will still promote 
judicial efficiency by unearthing the relevant evidence and by 
providing a record which the court may review." 
Id. at 605 (citation omitted). This is consistent with other courts which have held 
that an employee must exhaust internal grievance procedures.19 
In this case, Ms. Canfield now grounds her claims in the City's "policies 
and procedures," but she has failed to allege that she has exhausted the grievance 
procedures applicable to those policies and procedures. If Ms. Canfield or Utah 
other public employees are permitted to file lawsuits without first exhausting these 
19See, e.g., Bockover v. Perko, 34 Cal. Rptr.2d 423 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) 
(fired employee of public university laboratory must exhaust internal grievance 
procedure before filing lawsuit); Aranoffv. Bryan, 569 A.2d 466, 469-470 (Vt. 
1989) (law clerk for state court must exhaust grievance procedure injudicial 
branch Personnel Policy before filing lawsuit); Edgren v. Regents of Univ. of Cal, 
205 Cal. Rptr. 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (dismissal appropriate because architect 
employed by state university failed to exhaust internal grievance policies). 
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remedies, the judicial system will become inundated with employment-related 
claims by public employees, which are more properly dealt with in the first 
instance through internal grievance procedures. Thus, the City asks this Court to 
find that there is a lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Ms. Canfield failed 
to exhaust internal remedies that Utah statute authorized the City to adopt. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the City respectfully submits that the trial 
court's dismissal of Ms Canfield's lawsuit should be affirmed. 
DATED this O day of October, 2003. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Judith D. Wolferts 
Maralyn M. Reger 
Attorneys for Appellee/Defendant 
Layton City 
N:\13607\520\Appellate Brief TC 10-03-03.wpd 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 1 
Brad C. Smith, NO. 6656 
STEVENSON k SMITH. P.C. 
2605 Washington Blvd., Suite 300 
Ogden. Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-4573 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MACHELLE CANFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAYTON CITY, a Utah 
municipality, 
: AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 020800412 
Judge: Glen R. Dawson 
Defendant. 
Comes now Plaintiff, by and through counsel, and complains 
and alleges of Defendant as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION a VEWUE 
1. Machelle Canfield is a resident of Weber County, State of 
Utah. 
2. Defendant Layton City, is a Utah municipality, located in 
Davis County, State of Utah. 
3. Venue and jurisdiction are proper in the above-entitled 
court. 
WED 12:52 FAX 801 546 I LAYTON CITY ADMIN, 
TKCTUKL ALLBGATIQNg 
4* Plaintiff was employed as a police department dispatcher for 
Defendant, Layton City. Prior to July 2001, Plaintiff had 
been employed by Defendant for in excess of thirteen {13} 
years. During that period of time she was a police 
dispatcher. Approximately six months prior to the 
termination of her employment, Plaintiff was placed under 
the charge of a new supervisor, Lisa Murdock. 
5. Ms. Murdock unfairly and unjustly scrutinized the work 
performance of Plaintiff and created a hostile, tense and 
stressful environment, in an area that is already stress 
ridden, 
6- On 12 June 2 001, Plaintiff left work due to stress and 
informed Lisa Murdock that she was going to take her 
daughter to the doctor's office. Plaintiff reported said 
hours on her time sheet. 
7. Due to the stress situation. Plaintiff decided it was best 
not to go back to work until Lt, Moyes had returned and we 
could resolve the situation. Plaintiff spoke with Lt. Moyes 
on Monday morning, June llcl\ and he had asked if Plaintiff 
should be alright until he got back, Plaintiff thought she 
would. 
8- On Tuesday, the 12th. Plaintiff left 4.5 hours early, and 
that evening she called dispatch to have her shift filled 
for the next day. 
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$. Lisa called Plaintiff back and said that Plaintiff needed to 
be at work- Plaintiff went to work at 7:00 a.m. When 
Plaintiff came in to work later in the morning, Lisa asked 
if she needed to leave. Plaintiff said if she could skip 
lunch and go home early it would be better, Lisa said she 
would see what she could do since she is the lunch relief, 
Lisa came up several hours later and told Plaintiff to go t 
lunch. Plaintiff assumed that meant she was not: going home 
early. 
10. In the meantime Plaintiff's daughter called on he cell phone 
and said that her knee and ankle were hurting from the 
basketball camp that morning- (She has had other ankle 
injuries) -
11. At 2:00 p.m. Lisa came back to dispatch and told Plaintiff 
she could leave. Plaintiff was surprised- Plaintiff was 
walking out the door and Lisa said Bhe would need a doctor's 
excuse for the one hour she was leaving early. 
12. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereupon alleges, 
that numerous employees of City have used sick leave in the 
same manner as Plaintiff but have not been subject: to any 
disciplinary proceeding whatsoever. Accordingly. Plaintiff 
has been treated differently from and more severely than 
other employees of Defendant, all in contravention of 
Defendant's specific written policy. 
13. Officers, employees, agents or servants of Defendant 
WED 12:S3 FAX 801 54B 
confronted Plaintiff with the allegation that Plaintiff had 
misused sick l«ava and gave her an ultimatum that she resign 
from the City or face termination. Because of her fear that 
a termination would preclude her from obtaining future 
gainful employment, Plaintiff and reluctantly and against 
her will accepted termination. 
14. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges 
that other employees of City have bean subject to 
allegations regarding misuse of sick leave and/or other 
instances in which they have been accused, rightly or 
wrongly, of stealing city property, misusing city time or 
similar allegations. 
15. Plaintiff is informed and believes and there upon alleges 
that eaid individuals have not been punished as severely as 
she has, have not been terminated, or not given an 
ultimatum, but instead, were given employee warnings, 
probation, and other punishment. 
16. Defendant's personnel policy specifically require that 
Plaintiff be treated fairly and that any punishments or 
discipline given to her be proportionate to the offense 
alleged. Defendant's punishment of Plaintiff, including its 
termination of her, was disproportionate to the acts 
alleged, even if the acts were taken as true. 
WHEREFORE,. Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendant as 
follows; 
1. For damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
2. For reinstatement or other appropriate remedy. 
3- For costs of court and attorney's fees as the same may 
be allowed by law. 
4. For such other and further relief as the court deems 
just and proper. 
DATED this /£ day of Marcfcu 2002. 
Brad C. Smith 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintiffs Address: 
3552 W. 5000 S. 
Roy, Utah 84067 
ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 2 
STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119) 
CAMUXE N. JOHNSON (A5494) 
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468) 
SNOW, CHRJSTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
MACHELLE CANFIELD, 
DEFENDANT LAYTON CITY'S 
Plaintiff, ANSWER TO AMENDED 
COMPLAINT 
vs. 
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality, C a s e N a 
Defendant. Judge 
Defendant Layton City hereby answers plaintiffs Amended Complaint as follows: 
PARTIES. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the 
truth of the allegations of paragraph 1 of the Amended Complaint, and on that basis denies the 
allegations of paragraph 1 of the Amended Complaint. 
2. Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 2 of the Amended Complaint. 
3. The allegations contained in paragraph 3 of the Amended Complaint are legal 
conclusions consisting of allegations regarding jurisdiction and venue, and require no answer. To 
the extent paragraph 3 requires an answer, defendant denies each and every allegation. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
4. Defendant admits that plaintiff was employed as a police department dispatcher for 
Layton City and had held that position for more than 13 years at the time of her resignation. 
Defendant admits and affirmatively asserts that approximately six months prior to her resignation, 
plaintiff was placed under the charge of a new supervisor, Lisa Murdock. Defendant denies the 
remaining allegations of paragraph 4 of the Amended Complaint. 
5. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 5 of the Amended Complaint. 
6. In response to the allegations of paragraph 6 of the Amended Complaint, 
defendant admits that on June 12, 2001, plaintiff left work early informing her supervisor Lisa 
Murdock that she was going to take her daughter to the doctor's office. Defendant admits that 
plaintiff reported 4.5 hours sick leave for June 12, 2001. Defendant denies the remaining 
allegations of paragraph 6 of the Amended Complaint. 
7. In response to the allegations of paragraph 7 of the Amended Complaint, 
defendant admits that plaintiff spoke with Lt. Moyes on June 11, 2001. Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of paragraph 
7 of the Amended Complaint concerning plaintiffs thoughts and decision and on that basis denies 
those allegations. Defendant denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 7 of the Amended 
Complaint. 
8. In response to the allegations of paragraph 8 of the Amended Complaint, 
defendant admits that plaintiff left her shift early on June 12, 2001 and that she called in sick to 
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dispatch for the next day. Defendant denies the remaining allegations in paragraph 8 of the 
Amended Complaint. 
9. In response to the allegations of paragraph 9 of the Amended Complaint, 
defendant admits that Lisa Murdock told plaintiff that she needed to come to work on June 13, 
2001. Defendant admits that plaintiffs time sheet reflects that she reported to work at 7:00 a.m. 
on June 13, 2001. The remaining allegations of paragraph 9 of the Amended Complaint are vague 
and ambiguous and on that basis defendant denies them. 
10. Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to 
plaintiffs cell phone calls, and on that basis denies the allegations of paragraph 10 of the 
Amended Complaint. 
11. In response to the allegations of paragraph 11 of the Amended Complaint, 
defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to plaintiffs thoughts 
and the other allegations are vague and ambiguous, and on that basis defendant denies the 
allegations of paragraph 11 of the Amended Complaint. 
12. As to the allegations of paragraph 12 of the Amended Complaint, defendant admits 
that employees of Layton City have used sick leave. Defendant denies the remaining allegations 
of paragraph 12 of the Amended Complaint. 
13. In response to the allegations of paragraph 13 of the Amended Complaint, 
defendant admits that it confronted plaintiff with her violation of Layton City and Police 
Department Policies and that plaintiff resigned her employment. Defendant is without knowledge 
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations concerning plaintiffs 
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"fear" and on that basis denies those allegations. Defendant denies the remaining allegations of 
paragraph 13 of the Amended Complaint. 
14. In response to the allegations of paragraph 14 of the Amended Complaint, 
defendant admits that other City employees have been accused of violating City policy. 
Defendant denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 14 of the Amended Complaint. 
15. Defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 15 of the Amended Complaint. 
16. In response to the allegations of paragraph 16 of the Amended Complaint, 
defendant asserts that its personnel policy speaks for itself and any attempt to characterize it is 
denied. Defendant denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 16 of the Amended Complaint. 
Defendant denies the allegations of that paragraph of the Amended Complaint which 
begins "WHEREFORE." 
Defendant denies all allegations in the Amended Complaint that relate or are directed to 
defendant unless those allegations are expressly admitted in the Answer. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
As separate and distinct affirmative defenses to plaintiffs causes of action against 
defendant in the Amended Complaint, defendant alleges as follows: 
First Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
Second Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs claims as asserted in the Amended Complaint are barred by the applicable 
statutes of limitations, including, without limitation, §§ 78-12-23(2), 78-12-25(1) and (3), 78-12-
28, 78-12-29 and 78-12-30, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
4 
Third Affirmative Defense 
Defendant is immune and/or this action is barred, in whole or in part, by virtue of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, § 63-30-1 et seq., Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), including, 
without limitation, §§ 63-30-3, -4, -5, -10, -11, -13, -15, and -19, and by plaintiffs failure to 
comply with the provisions of said Act. In any event, defendant's liability is limited by said Act, 
as provided by, inter alia, § 63-30-34, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
Fourth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs claims are not actionable as pled. 
Fifth Affirmative Defense 
Defendant specifically denies violating any federal or state constitutional, statutory, or 
common law right of the plaintiff. 
Sixth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint is unconstitutionally vague, and constitutes a denial of due 
process. 
Seventh Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiff has failed to mitigate her damages, if any. Plaintiff is thereby barred in whole or 
in part from recovering monetary damages from defendant. In addition, or alternatively, any 
compensation or benefits received by plaintiff after her resignation, including unemployment 
compensation, must be applied to reduce any damages claimed by plaintiff. 
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Eighth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiff voluntarily terminated her employment, and is, therefore, estopped and has 
waived any right to bring claims or seek damages or other relief from any defendant, including but 
not limited to reinstatement, back pay, or future pay. 
Ninth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiff waived her rights, if any, to seek damages or other relief from defendant. 
Tenth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiff is estopped from asserting any and all causes of action against defendant. 
Eleventh Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiff is barred under the doctrine of unclean hands from all forms of equitable relief 
sought in her Amended Complaint. 
Twelfth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiff is barred under the doctrine of laches from all forms of relief sought in her 
Amended Complaint. 
Thirteenth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiff has failed to exhaust applicable procedural, administrative, statutory or judicial 
remedies otherwise available to her, and this action is therefore barred, in whole or in part. 
Fourteenth Affirmative Defense 
All acts or omissions of defendant were undertaken in good faith, without malice, with 
probable cause, and were fully justified and reasonable under the circumstances. 
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Fifteenth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs actions violated applicable rules, regulations, policies, procedures, and/or 
standards of behavior. Any actions of defendant were in response to plaintiffs actions and were 
reasonable and justified under the circumstances. 
Sixteenth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs punitive damages claim, if any, must be established in accordance with Utah 
Code Ann. §78-18-1. 
Seventeenth Affirmative Defense 
As a matter of law, plaintiff is not entitled to recover punitive or exemplary damages from 
defendant. 
Eighteenth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiff must prove her claim for punitive damages by a unanimous verdict, and the 
burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Nineteenth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs punitive damage claims are barred by the prohibition of ex post facto laws in 
Article I, Section 18 of the Utah Constitution, and the Open Courts provision, Article I, Section II 
of the Utah Constitution. 
Twentieth Affirmative Defense 
Defendant did not act with actual malice or reckless indifference, and any award of 
punitive damages is barred. 
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Twenty-First Affirmative Defense 
The punitive damages claims are barred by the United States Constitution and 
amendments thereto, including: Article I, Section 10[1] (Contracts Clause); Fifth Amendment 
(Due Process); Eighth Amendment (Cruel and Unusual Punishment; Excessive Fines); and 
Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process and Equal Protection). 
Twenty-Second Affirmative Defense 
The punitive damages claims are barred by the Constitution of Utah, including Article I, 
Section 7 (Due Process), Section 9 (Excessive Fines; Cruel and Unusual Punishment), and 
Section 12 (Self-incrimination). 
Twenty-Third Affirmative Defense 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, defendant is entitled to recover reasonable 
attorneys5 fees against plaintiff on the grounds that this action, in whole or in part, is brought 
without merit and has not been brought or asserted in good faith. 
Twenty-Fourth Affirmative Defense 
Defendant is protected by the doctrines of qualified and good faith immunity both at 
common and under statutory law. 
Twenty-Fifth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs recovery, if any, is limited by Utah Code Ann., §§ 63-30-22 and -34. 
Twenty-Sixth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs damages, if any, were not caused by an official policy or custom of defendant. 
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Twenty-Seventh Affirmative Defense 
Defendant cannot be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior 
WHEREFORE, defendant prays judgment as follows 
1 That plaintiff take nothing from defendant by way of her Amended Complaint, and 
that the Amended Complaint against defendant be dismissed, with prejudice; 
2 That defendant be awarded its costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees 
incurred herein; and 
3 That this Court award such other and further relief as it may deem just 
DATED this % day of April, 2002 
SNOW, CHRJSTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By \M(kNaiiy^ | M j A ^ 
Stanley J. Preston 
Camille N. Johnson 
Maralyn M. Reger 
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City 
N \13607\520\Pleaduigs\Answer to Amended Complaint2 wpd 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 3 
STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119) 
CAMJLLEN. JOHNSON (A5494) 
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468) 
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
MACHELLE CANFIELD, 
NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF A CIVIL 
Plaintiff, ACTION FROM STATE COURT TO 
FEDERAL COURT 
vs. 
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality, C a s e N a 
Defendant. Judge 
Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1443 and 1446, defendant Layton City, through its attorneys, 
hereby gives NOTICE OF REMOVAL of the civil action pending against it in the Second District 
Court of the County of Davis, State of Utah, to this Court. Layton City alleges as grounds for 
removal the following: 
1. On March 19, 2002, Layton City was served with a Summons and Amended 
Complaint in the civil action titled Machelle Canfield v. Lavton City, a Utah municipality. Civil 
No. 020800412, which commenced in the Second Judicial District Court in and for the County of 
Davis, State of Utah. 
2. The Amended Complaint alleges an equal protection claim under a federal statute, 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
3. This Court has original jurisdiction of the above-entitled action, pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1331, and hence, this action may be removed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1441, 1443. Copies of the Summons and Amended Complaint are attached hereto 
WHEREFORE, defendant Layton City hereby submits notice that the above-entitled 
matter is removed from the Second Judicial District Court in and for the County of Davis, State 
of Utah, to this Court, in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1446. 
DATED this 8th day of April, 2002. 
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By \ H ^ A y - \ X r K i n 
Stanley J. Preston A 
Camille N. Johnson 
Maralyn M. Reger 
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City 
N:\13607\520\Pleadings\Removal-FederalCt.wpd 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 4 
STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119) 
CAMILLE N. JOHNSON (A5494) 
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
Fax No.: (801)363-0400 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
MACHELLE CANFIELD, 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
Plaintiff, SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR AN 
ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO 
vs. FILE A SECOND AMENDED 
COMPLAINT THAT STATES 
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality, CLEARLY ANY CAUSE OF ACTION 
ASSERTED AGAINST LAYTON CITY 
Defendant. 
Case No. 1.02-CV-00041 K 
Judge Dale A. Kimball 
Magistrate Judge Ronald Boyce 
Pursuant to the Court's inherent authority, defendant Layton City ("the City") respectfully 
submits this memorandum in support of its motion for an order requiring plaintiff to file a 
Second Amended Complaint that states clearly any cause of action asserted against the City. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On March 18, 2002, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in the Second Judicial 
District Court for Davis County, Bountiful Department, State of Utah. 
2. The City received a copy of the Amended Complaint and Summons on March 29, 
2002. 
3. Based upon the Amended Complaint, the City believed that plaintiff was 
attempting to assert an Equal Protection claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On April 8, 2002, 
the City removed the action on that basis. 
4. On April 12, 2002, plaintiff filed a pleading in this Court, in which plaintiff 
demanded a trial by jury and acknowledged notice of the case's removal from state court to 
federal court. Plaintiff did not file an objection to the removal. 
5. On May 9, 2002, plaintiffs attorney and the City's attorney met telephonically, 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f). Plaintiffs attorney did not object to the 
removal or assert that there was no basis for removal. An Attorneys' Planning Meeting Report, 
signed by plaintiffs attorney, was submitted to the Court on May 22, 2002. 
6. On July 8, 2002, plaintiff served her initial disclosures. The City served its initial 
disclosures on July 12, 2002. 
7. On July 16, 2002, the City served its first set of interrogatories and document 
requests on plaintiff. Plaintiff did not file any objections to the City's discovery requests. 
8. An initial pretrial conference was held in this matter on August 22, 2002. During 
the initial pretrial conference, Magistrate Boyce stated that it was unclear from the Amended 
-2-
Complaint whether plaintiff was asserting an Equal Protection claim. Plaintiffs attorney, in 
open court, responded that the plaintiff was asserting a "disparate treatment" claim under Layton 
City policies, not an Equal Protection claim. 
9. On August 22, 2002, the parties were ordered to show cause why this case should 
not be remanded to state court. 
ARGUMENT 
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and must, as a threshold matter, determine 
questions of jurisdiction. See Montoya v. Chao, 296 F.3d 952, 955 (10th Cir. 2002). Based upon 
the Amended Complaint plaintiff filed in state court, the City believed that plaintiff was 
attempting to assert an Equal Protection claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The City removed 
the action on that basis. Months later, after an attorneys' planning report was filed, initial 
disclosures were made, and discovery requests were served, plaintiffs attorney, in response to a 
question by Magistrate Boyce at the initial pretrial hearing, stated for the first time that the 
plaintiff was asserting a "disparate treatment" claim under the City's policies, not an Equal 
Protection claim. No such actionable claim exists, and use of the phrase "disparate treatment" 
gives rise to equal protection issues.1 
The Court has now ordered the parties to show cause why the case should not be 
remanded to state court. However, based on the vagueness of the Amended Complaint, it is 
unclear what cause of action plaintiff is attempting to assert, and whether she has attempted to 
JThe Court's Order to Show Cause references civil service standards; however, Layton 
City does not have a civil service commission. 
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state a claim under the United States Constitution or a federal statute. Thus, it cannot be 
determined, based upon the current state of the pleadings, whether this Court has subject matter 
jurisdiction over this action. 
Accordingly, the City respectfully moves the Court for an order requiring plaintiff to file 
a Second Amended Complaint that states clearly any cause of action asserted against the City. 
DATED this 2&fa day of August, 2002. 
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Stanley J. Weiton J 
Camille N.uohnspn 
Maralyn M. KSger 
Attorneys for Defendant 
N:\13607\520\Pleadings\DefiniteStatementMem.wpd 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 5 
FILED 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH ' ' ' ' ' r 
22 RUG 02 PM 3= 31 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
DISTRICl OF UTAH 
MACHELLE CANFIELD, 
Plaintiff(s), 
v. 
LAYTON CITY, 
Defendant(s) 
BY:. 
DEPUTY CLERK 
Case No. 02-NC-41 DK 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
The above entitled matter was removed from state court on defendant's 
contention that plaintiff was asserting a claim under 42 USC § 1983. The plaintiff 
did not allege such a claim and at pretrial before the magistrate judge plaintiff 's 
counsel asserted there was no federal equal protection claim being pursued. 
Therefore, the case involves only state issues of violation of plaintiff 's rights under 
Layton City's civil service standards. Therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the parties shall, on or before September 28, 2002 , 
show cause why this case should not be remanded to state court under 28 USC § 
1441(c) and § 1447(c). 
DATED this 'QQ- day of August . 2002 . 
BY THE COURT: 
Dale Kimball, Judge 
^ 
United States District Court 
£^^y 
ce 
United States District Court 
for the 
District of Utah 
August 23, 2 002 
* * CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF CLERK * * 
l:02-cv-00041 
and correct copies of the attached were either mailed or faxed by the 
: to the following: 
Brad C. Smith, Esq. 
STEVENSON & SMITH 
3 9 86 WASHINGTON BLVD 
OGDEN, UT 84403 
Stanley J, Preston, Esq. 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE 
PO BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145-5000 
JFAX 9,3630400 
ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 6 
STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119) 
CAMILLE N. JOHNSON (A5494) 
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468) 
SNOW, CHRJSTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
Fax No.: (801)363-0400 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
MACHELLE CANFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR AN 
ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO 
FILE A SECOND AMENDED 
COMPLAINT THAT STATES 
CLEARLY ANY CAUSE OF ACTION 
ASSERTED AGAINST LAYTON CITY 
Case No. 1:02-CV-00041 K 
Judge Dale A. Kimball 
Magistrate Judge Ronald Boyce 
Pursuant to the Court's inherent authority, defendant Layton City ("the City") respectfully 
moves the Court for an order requiring plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint that states 
clearly any cause of action asserted against the City. 
Based upon the Amended Complaint plaintiff filed in state court, the City believed that 
plaintiff was attempting to assert an Equal Protection claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The 
City removed the action on that basis. Months later, after an attorneys' planning report was filed, 
initial disclosures were made, and discovery requests were served, plaintiffs attorney, in 
response to a question by Magistrate Boyce at the initial pretrial hearing, stated for the first time 
that the plaintiff was not asserting an Equal Protection claim. The Court has now ordered the 
parties to show cause why the case should not be remanded to state court. However, based on the 
vagueness of the Complaint, it is now unclear what claim plaintiff is asserting and whether this 
Court has jurisdiction over this matter. 
Accordingly, the City respectfully moves the Court for an order requiring the plaintiff to 
file a Second Amended Complaint that states clearly any cause of action asserted against the 
City. 
DATED this 2fcft day of August, 2002. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Stanley J. Preston >/ 
Camille Nv^Johpscm 
Maralyn M. Reger 
Attorneys for Defendant 
N \13607\520\Pleadings\DefiniteStatementMotJon wpd 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 7 
STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119) 
CAMILLE N. JOHNSON (A5494) 
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468) 
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
Fax No.: (801)363-0400 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
MACHELLE CANFIELD, 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO 
Plaintiff, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
vs. 
Case No. 1:02-CV-00041 K 
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality, 
Judge Dale A. Kimball 
Defendant. 
Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba 
Defendant Layton City ("the City") respectfully submits this response to the Court's 
Order to Show Cause why this case should not be remanded to state court. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On March 18,2002, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in the Second Judicial 
District Court for Davis County, Bountiful Department, State of Utah. A copy of the Amended 
Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The Amended Complaint does not identify a "cause 
of action" or "claim for relief." 
2. The City received a copy of the Amended Complaint and Summons on March 29, 
2002. 
3. Based upon the allegations of the Amended Complaint, the City believed that 
plaintiff was attempting to assert an Equal Protection claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On 
April 8, 2002, the City removed the action on the grounds that this Court had original jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
4. On April 12, 2002, plaintiff filed a pleading in this Court, in which plaintiff 
demanded a trial by jury and acknowledged notice of the case's removal from state court to 
federal court. Plaintiff did not file an objection to the removal. 
5. On May 9, 2002, plaintiffs attorney and the City's attorney met telephonically, 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f). Plaintiffs attorney did not object to the 
removal or assert that there was no basis for removal. An Attorneys' Planning Meeting Report, 
signed by plaintiff s attorney, was submitted to the Court on May 22, 2002. 
6. On July 8, 2002, plaintiff served her initial disclosures. The City served its initial 
disclosures on July 12, 2002. 
7. On July 16, 2002, the City served its first set of interrogatories and document 
requests on plaintiff. Plaintiff did not file any objections to the City's discovery requests. 
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8. An initial pretrial conference was held in this matter on August 22, 2002. During 
the initial pretrial conference, Magistrate Boyce stated that it was unclear from the Amended 
Complaint whether plaintiff was asserting an Equal Protection claim. Plaintiffs attorney, in 
open court, responded that the plaintiff was asserting a "disparate treatment" claim under Layton 
City policies, not an Equal Protection claim. 
9. In light of plaintiff s attorney's comments, counsel for the City asked, in writing, 
that plaintiffs attorney identify with specificity the plaintiffs claim. 
10. On August 26, 2002, the City filed a Motion for an Order Requiring Plaintiff to 
File a Second Amended Complaint that States Clearly any Cause of Action Asserted Against 
Layton City. 
11. Plaintiffs attorney has not yet responded to the City's Motion, however he did 
respond in writing to the City's request that he identify with specificity his client's claim. Mr. 
Smith's September 20, 2002 letter to counsel for the City provides: 
Ms. Canfield's claim is one for constructive termination on the basis that Layton 
City failed to follow its own termination policy and deprived Ms. Canfield of her 
job without due process of law. 
I suppose as to the depravation [sic] of due process Federal Fourteenth 
Amendment case law would be implicated. 
See September 20, 2002 letter attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
-3-
ARGUMENT 
Based upon the Amended Complaint plaintiff filed in state court, the City believed that 
plaintiff was attempting to assert an Equal Protection claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The 
City removed the action on that basis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question 
jurisdiction). Months later, after an attorneys' planning report was filed, initial disclosures were 
made, and discovery requests were served, plaintiffs attorney, in response to a question by 
Magistrate Boyce at the initial pretrial hearing, stated for the first time that the plaintiff was 
asserting a "disparate treatment" claim under the City's policies, not an Equal Protection claim. 
No such actionable claim exists, and use of the phrase "disparate treatment" gives rise to equal 
protection issues.1 Now, plaintiffs attorney has identified his client's claim as one for 
deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
See Exhibit B. That being the case, this Court has original jurisdiction of the case under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331,2 and the case should not be remanded to state court. 
The City asks not only that this Court retain jurisdiction of this case, but that it grant the 
City's Motion for an Order Requiring Plaintiff to File a Second Amended Complaint that States 
Clearly any Cause of Action Asserted Against Layton City. The vagueness of the Amended 
*The Court's Order to Show Cause references civil service standards; however, Layton 
City does not have a civil service commission. 
228 U.S.C. § 1331 provides: 'The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil 
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 
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Complaint can only be remedied with an amendment which pleads the cause of action plaintiff 
now purports to assert. 
DATED this £Sfo day of September, 2002. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Camille Wtkflinson 
Maralyn M. Reger 
Attorneys for Defendant 
N:\13607\520\Pleadings\ResponseOSC.wpd 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S 
RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (Case No. 1:02CV00041, United States 
District Court, District of Utah) was served on the parties listed below by first class mail, 
postage prepaid, this flo^day of September, 2002. 
Brad C. Smith 
STEVENSON & SMITH 
3986 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden,Utah 84403 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
L i ^ M u n t e r 
EXHIBIT A 
/02 WED 12:52 FAX 801 646 LAYTON CITY ADMIN. 
II 
Brad C. Smith, NO. 6656 
STEVENSON & SMITH. P.C. 
2605 Washington Blvd., Suite 300 
Ogden. Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-4573 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
m m m 
i l l 
II-1 
MACHELLE CANFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAYTON CITY, a Utah 
municipality. 
Defendant„ 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 020800412 
Judge: Glen R, Dawson 
Comes now Plaintiff, by and through counsel, and complains 
and alleges of Defendant as follows: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION a VENUE 
1. Macbelle Caixfield is a resident of Weber County, State of 
Utah. 
2. Defendant Layton City, is a Utah municipality, located in 
Davis County, State of Utah. 
3. Venue and jurisdiction are proper in the above-entitled 
court. 
?l /02 THU 1 0 : i » tJUi tux m 
UXVDLOIA 
02 WED 12:52 FAX 801 546 8 LAYTON CITY ADMIN, 
1 i s 
II* 
2 § S 
rACTOAL AILBQATIOHfl 
4. Plaintiff was employed as a police department dispatcher fox 
Defendant, Lay ton City, Prior to July 2001, Plaintiff had 
been employed by Defendant for in excess of thirteen (13) 
years. During that period of time she was a police 
dispatcher. Approximately six months prior to the 
termination of her employment* Plaintiff was placed under 
the charge of a new supervisor, Lisa Murdock-
5* Ms. Murdock unfairly and unjustly scrutinized the work 
performance of Plaintiff and created a hostile, tense and 
stressful environment, in an area that is already stress 
ridden. 
6. On 12 June 2001, Plaintiff left work due to stress and . 
informed Lisa Murdock that she was going to take her 
daughter to the doctor's office. Plaintiff reported said 
hours on her time sheet. 
7. Due to the stress situation. Plaintiff decided it was best 
not to go back to work until Lt, Moyes had returned and we 
could resolve the situation. Plaintiff spoke with Lt. Moyes 
on Monday morning, June llcnf and he had asked if Plaintiff 
should be alright until he got back. Plaintiff thought she 
would• 
8. On Tuesday, the 12th, Plaintiff left 4.5 hours early, and 
that evening she called dispatch to have her shift filled 
for the next day. 
WED 12:52 FAX 801 546 UYTON CITY ADMIN. icy uva 
$. Lisa called Plaintiff back and said that Plaintiff needed to 
be at work. Plaintiff went to work at 7:00 a.m. When 
Plaintiff came in to work later in the morning, Lisa asked 
if she needed to leave. Plaintiff said if she could skip 
lunch and go home early it would be better. Lisa said she 
would see what she could do since she is the lunch relief, 
Lisa came up several hours later and told Plaintiff to go t 
lunch- Plaintiff assumed that meant she was not: going home 
early, 
10. In the meantime Plaintiff's daughter called on he cell phone 
and said that her knee and ankle were hurting from the 
basketball camp that morning. (She has had other ankle 
injuries). 
11. At 2:00 p.m. Lisa came back to dispatch and told Plaintiff 
she could leave. Plaintiff was surprised. Plaintiff was 
walking out the door and Lisa said Bhe would need a doctor's 
excuse for the one hour she was leaving early. 
12. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereupon alleges, 
that numerous employees of City have used sick leave in the 
same manner as Plaintiff but have not been subject to any 
disciplinary proceeding whatsoever. Accordingly* Plaintiff 
has been treated differently from and more severely than 
other employees of Defendant, all in contravention of 
Defendant's specific written policy. 
13. Officers, employees, agents or servants of Defendant 
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confronted Plaintiff with the allegation that Plaintiff had 
misused sick leave and gave her an ultimatum that she resign 
from the city or face termination. Because of her fear that 
a termination would preclude her from obtaining future 
gainful employment, Plaintiff and reluctantly and against 
her will accepted termination. 
Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges 
that other employees of City have been subject to 
allegations regarding misuse of sick leave and/or other 
instances in which they have been accused, rightly or 
wrongly, of stealing city property, misusing city time or 
similar allegations. 
Plaintiff is informed and believes and there upon alleges 
that said individuals have not been punished as severely as 
she has, have not been terminated, or not given an 
ultimatum, but instead, were given employee warnings, 
probation, and other punishment. 
Defendant's personnel policy specifically require that 
Plaintiff be treated fairly and that any punishments or 
discipline given to her be proportionate to the offense 
alleged> Defendant's punishment of Plaintiff, .including its 
termination of her, was disproportionate to the acts 
alleged, even if the acts were taken as true. 
WED 12:53 FAX 801 646 LAYTON CITY ADMIN, 
WHEREFORE,. Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendant as 
follows: 
1. For damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
2, For reinstatement or other appropriate remedy. 
3. For costs of court and attorney's fses as the same may 
be allowed by law. 
4, For such other and further relief as the court deems 
just and proper. 
DATED this /<? day of Marcku 2002. 
Brad C. Smith 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintiffs Address: 
3552 W. 5000 S. 
Roy, Utah B4067 
EXHIBIT B 
STEVENSON & SMITH 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
3986 WASHINGTON BOULEVARD 
H. THOMAS STEVENSON* O G D E N , UTAH 84403 
BRAD C. SMITH TELEPHONE (801) 399-9910 OR (801) 394-4573 
'ADMITTED IN UTAH AND IDAHO FACSIMILE ( 8 0 1 ) 3 9 9 - 9 9 5 4 
September 20,2002 
Camille N. Johnson 
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
Re: Machelle Canfield v. Layton City 
Dear Camille, 
You have requested that I provide you with some sort of more definitive statement as to 
what my client's claims are. I thought this was covered while we were in court. However, I will 
oblige your request. 
Ms. Canfield's claim is one for constructive termination on the basis that Layton City 
failed to follow its own termination policy and deprived Ms. Canfield of her job without due 
process of law. 
I suppose as to the depravation of due process Federal Fourteenth Amendment case law 
would be implicated. However, contrary to the representation you made in your removal 
notification I have not and have not intended to assert an equal protection claim arising under 42 
U.S.C. §1983. At present I am unaware of any facts which would suggest that Ms. Canfield was 
demed equal protection of the law based on any invidious or forbidden group membership. I am 
unaware of any evidence that would show that Ms. Canfield was terminated or subjected to a 
subjective termination as a result of her gender, age, race, religion, handicap, or national origin. 
Accordingly, I do not believe there is any equal protection claim to be made here and have not 
intended to make one. 
If you have any other questions on this matter please feel free to contact me. 
Respectfully, 
Brad C. Smith 
O F COUNSEL: 
DAVID S. K U N Z 
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FILED 
CI.fRK.US DISTRICT COURT 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR TMBTWRTRfRfl&JfT^ 
NORTHERN DIVISION B^£pUTY CLEM " 
MACHIELLE CANFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 1:02-CV-41 K 
ORDER 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for An Order Requiring Plaintiff to 
File a Second Amended Complaint that States Clearly any Cause of Action Asserted Against Layton 
City. No response having been filed, the motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff has thirty days to 
comply and file an Amended Complaint. 
DATED this / ~ ( i a v of October, 2002. 
BY T H E C O U R T : 
SAMUEL ALBA 
United States Magistrate Judge 
aep 
United States District Court 
for the 
District of Utah 
October 2, 2002 
* * CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF CLERK * * 
l:02-cv-00041 
» and correct copies of the attached were either mailed, faxed or e-mailed 
:he clerk to the following: 
Brad C. Smith, Esq. 
STEVENSON & SMITH 
3 98 6 WASHINGTON BLVD 
OGDEN, UT 84403 
Stanley J. Preston, Esq. 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE 
PO BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145-5000 
EFAX 9,3630400 
ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 9 
STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119) 
CAMILLE N. JOHNSON (A5494) 
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468) 
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
Fax No.: (801)363-0400 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
MACHELLE CANFIELD, 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Case No. 1:02-CV-00041 
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality, Judge Dale A. Kimball 
Defendant. Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba 
Defendant Layton City moves to dismiss the captioned case for plaintiffs failure to 
comply with the Court's October 1, 2002 Order which requires plaintiff to file a Second 
Amended Complaint on or before October 31, 2002. The basis for this Motion is set forth with 
more particularity in the accompanying Memorandum. 
DATED this [ffr day of November, 2002. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
>restor 
Camille (N. Johnson 
Maralyn IVfReger 
Attorneys for Defendant 
N \l3607\520\Pleadin»s\Motion to Dismiss wpd 
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STANLEY J. PRESTON (A4119) 
CAMILLE N. JOHNSON (A5494) 
MARALYN M. REGER (A8468) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Layton City 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
Fax No.: (801)363-0400 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
MACHELLE CANFIELD, 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
Plaintiff, AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
vs. 
Case No. 1:02-CV-00041 
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality, 
Judge Dale A. Kimball 
Defendant. 
Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba 
Defendant Layton City submits this memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss the 
captioned case for plaintiffs failure to comply with this Court's Order. 
On October 1, 2002, this Court signed an Order granting Layton City's Motion to Compel 
and ordering plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint that states clearly any cause of action 
asserted against defendant Layton City. The Court gave plaintiff 30 days in which to comply and 
file the Second Amended Complaint. See Order attached as Exhibit "A." Plaintiff has failed to 
comply with the Court's Order in that she has not filed a Second Amended Complaint. For her 
failure to comply, this case should be dismissed. 
DATED this |5fo day of November, 2002. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINE AU 
Stanley J. Preston ) 
Camille N (Johnson 
Maralyn M. Reger 
Attorneys for Defendant 
N \13607\520\Pleadings\Memo in Support of Motion to Dismiss wpd 
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EXHIBIT A 
FILED 
CLERK. U S DISTRICT COURT 
-I 0CT02PH 1*56 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR T^B WftJR^lflftl/TAH 
BY:. NORTHERN DIVISION DEPUTY CLERK 
MACHIELLE CANFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAYTON CITY, a Utah municipality, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 1:02-CV-41 K 
ORDER 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for An Order Requiring Plaintiff to 
File a Second Amended Complaint that States Clearly any Cause of Action Asserted Against Layton 
City. No response having been filed, the motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff has thirty days to 
comply and file an Amended Complaint. 
DATED this _/_T<3ay of October, 2002. 
BY THE C O U R T : 
SAMUEL ALBA 
United States Magistrate Judge 
asp 
United States District Court 
for the 
District of Utah 
October 2, 2002 
* * CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF CLERK * * 
*e: l:02-cv-00041 
rrue and correct copies of the attached were either mailed, faxed or e-mail 
sy the clerk to the following: 
Brad C. Smith, Esq. 
STEVENSON & SMITH 
3986 WASHINGTON BLVD 
OGDEN, UT 84403 
Stanley J. Preston, Esq. 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE 
PO BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145-5000 
EFAX 9,3630400 
ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 10 
FILED 
18 NOV 02 PM ?-U5 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE D I S T R I O ^ 5 J ^ U ¥ A & UTAH 
NORTHERN DIVISION DEPUTY CI ERK 
MACHELLE CANFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAYTON CITY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 1:02CV41K 
On October 1, 2002, this court issued an Order requiring Plaintiff, within thirty days, to 
file a Second Amended Complaint that states clearly any cause of action asserted against Layton 
City. As of the date of this Order, Plaintiff has not complied with the court's Order. 
Based upon Plaintiffs failure to comply, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs 
case is DISMISSED. 
DATED this / j l 'day of November, 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
''&£> 
DALE A. 
United States District Judge 
& -
asp 
United States District Court 
for the 
District of Utah 
November 19, 2002 
* * CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF CLERK * * 
l:02-cv-00041 
and correct copies of the attached were either mailed, faxed or e-mailed 
he clerk to the following: 
Brad C. Smith, EBq. 
STEVENSON & SMITH 
3 98 6 WASHINGTON BLVD 
OGDEN, UT 844 03 
Stanley J. Preston, Esq. 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE 
PO BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145-5000 
EFAX 9,363 04 00 
ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 11 
Brad C. Smith, NO. 6656 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
3986 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone: (801) 394-4573 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH 
** a> Oi 
^ o o ~~ 
<D 19 X C 
oo o a o 
*TI *-* 111 
MACHELLE CANFIELD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
LAYTON CITY, a Utah 
municipality, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S ANSWER TO 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES 
Civil No. 1:02-CV-00041 K 
Judge: Dale A. Kimball 
Comes now Plaintiff, by and through counsel, and answers 
Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories as follows: 
Interrogatory No. 1: Identify each person whom you 
anticipate that you will call or may call as a witness at the 
time of trial of this matter and state the topic or subject 
matter upon which each such witnesses will testify, the substance 
of the testimony of each witness with respect to each topic or 
subject matter, and the identity of all documents which relate to 
or concern any such testimony. 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 1: Plaintiff has not yet 
determined who she will call as witnesses at the time of trial, 
when this determination is made, Plaintiff will supplement this 
interrogatory. Plaintiff anticipates that her witnesses may 
include: Debbie PettiJohn, Layton Police Dispatch; Laree Hopkins, 
Layton Police Dispatch; Debbie Joubert, Layton Police Dispatch; 
Blake Haycock, Layton Police Officer; Lt. Quinn Moyes, Layton 
Police; and Lisa Murdock, Layton Police Dispatch. The above 
named individuals have knowledge of the circumstances of my 
separation with Layton City, my "Garrity" hearing# my use of sick 
leave, and my job performance. 
Interrogatory No, 2: Identify all documents that you 
anticipate presenting to a witness or the trier of the fact at 
the trial of this matter, whether as an exhibit or otherwise. 
Answer to Interrogatory No, 2; Machelle Canfield's Leave 
Time Sheet, Memorandum to Lt. Quinn Moyes from Plaintiff Machelle 
Canfield, Certificate to return to work or school from IHC Health 
Center. Plaintiff has not yet determined who she will call as 
witnesses at the time of trial, when this determination is made, 
Plaintiff will supplement this interrogatory. 
Interrogatory No, 3; Describe with specificity cill damages 
Ms. Canfield claims she has suffered as a result of the actions 
of the City complained of in her Amended Complaint, and all 
information concerning any such damages, including, without 
limitation: the precise nature of the damages suffered, the 
amount of any such damages, how each damages amount was 
2 
calculated or estimated, and identify each person involved in 
calculating such damages or who otherwise has knowledge of the 
basis for and method of calculation for such damages and 
summarize each such person's involvement and/or knowledge. 
Answer to Interrogatory No» 3: 
Past Wages 
2 July 2001 - 9 January 2002 
unemployed: 
at Layton: 
17.26/hr. X 40 x (211 days / 7) 
= $20,810.63 
15 January 2002 - 5 July 2002 
IRS 
(17.26 - 11.50) x 40 x (171 / 7) 
= $5,628.34 
Future Wages 
5 July 2002 - 2022 
(17.26 - 11.50) x 40 x 52 x 20 = $239,616.00 
Plaintiff is also entitled to general damages for suffering 
and humiliation. Plaintiff anticipates claiming an amount equal 
to front and back pay for general damages. 
The following individuals would have knowledge of the basis 
for and method of calculation for economic damages as they were 
her superiors and they participated in her performance reviews 
and have knowledge of her hourly wage, etc.: 
Lt. Quinn Moyes# Layton Police Dept., 429 N. Wasatch Dr, Layton 
801-546-8300 
Chief Terry Keefe, Layton Police Dept., 429 N. Wasatch Dr, Layton 
801-546-8300 
3 
55 ^  S 
the nature of the employment sought, identify each person you 
communicated with, identify all documents that refer or relate to 
contact with that person or entity, and describe the outcome of 
your contact with that individual or entity. 
Answer to Interrogatory No, 10; See response to Request for 
Production of Documents No. 13. 
Interrogatory No, 11: If you are aware of the existence of 
any written or recorded statement made by any party or potential 
witness, identify the person making the statement, the date of 
the statement, a summary of the contents of the statement, the 
name, address, telephone number and occupation of the person or 
persons taking the statement, and the name, address and telephone 
number of the person now in possession of the original statement. 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 11: Plaintiff is aware that her 
"Garrity" hearing was partially recorded. 
DATED this 
><£ 2? day of st, 2002 
Machelle Canfie 
Plaintiff L 
Plaintiff's Address 
3552 W. 5000 S. 
Roy, Utah 84067 
7 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WEBER 
:SS. 
On the 3. day of 2002, at Ogden, Utah, personally 
appeared before me Machelle Canfield, the signer of the within 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the 
same. 
yl&£^ Notary Public JULIE S.WILLIAMS 
863 25TH STREET 
OGDEN, UT 84414 
My Commission Expires 
JUNE 2*,2003 
8TATI OP UTAH 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Ogden, Utah 
My Commission Expires 
b'-d%-& 
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[Subject Area] Personnel [Effective Dale] 
February 12, 1996 
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3001 
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Revision of # 
Previously Effective 
D 
3001 
6-10-95, 10-24-95 
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[Type] Administrative Policy 
Personnel Policy 
Finance Policy 
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Risk Management 
Form 
D 
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[Approval Signature & Tide] 
llMs*^ City Manager 
[Pages] 
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The following personnel policies (3000 and 4000 series) set forth City policies and 
procedures for personnel administration, risk management and safety, as well as the 
conditions of employment with the City and the basis for compensation and benefits. 
The information contained in these policies shall be considered official policy of the Layton 
City Corporation arid may be revised from time to time by the City Manager or City 
Council with or without notice to the employee. The official interpretation of all matters 
dealt with in this manual shall be the responsibility of the City Manager. 
The policies and statemenfeiaiiiiai^^ manual and in other statements that may 
be issued from time to time, do not create a contract or agreement of anv kind between 
the Citv and its employees. Although thev reflect current policy, thev mav. at any time 
and for anv reason, with or without notice to employees, be changed or rescinded. 
Department Directors may, with the approval of the City Manager, establish additional 
policies and procedures as they deem necessary for the efficient and orderly administration 
and supervision of their departments, provided that they do not conflict with policies and 
procedures established in this manual. 
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Philosophy of Service 
The purpose of the City is to provide those service which the City Council deems 
necessary and desirable for the general health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of Layton. 
Essentially, all that each City employee does should be for the public benefit and advantage 
of the people residing within the corporate limits of Layton City, thus promoting their 
greater prosperity and general welfare. 
Specifically, the purpose of each department of the City is to provide the highest possible 
level of service at the most reasonable cost to the citizens. 
gmplpyment PhilosQphy 
The quality of the services provided by the City is dependent upon the individual initiative 
and responsibility of its employees. Successful employees are self-motivated, perceptive, 
problem-solvers, service-oriented, have an eye for detail, and follow a job through to its 
completion in a professional manner. 
Most work in the City is accomplished on a team basis. A productive and successful 
employee is expected to be able to work with others in a cooperative manner to accomplish' 
the purpose of the City. The unifying force of team action is communication. To this end, 
pertinent job-related information must be shared and communicated with all others in the 
City who have an interest or concern in the outcome of any job or endeavor. 
The City, therefore, seeks to attract and retain the most highly qualified and competent 
employees who exhibit the qualities and characteristics consistent with the job to be 
performed. 
Enforcement of Policies and Procedures 
The Department Director should enforce the City's Personnel Policies and Procedures and 
implement all procedures necessary to cany out the responsibilities of their respective 
departments consistent with these policies. The Department Director should notify all 
departmental employees of these policies and any amendments. 
Personnel Administration 
The administration of all personnel matters, except those specifically reserved by the City 
Council, are the responsibility of the City Manager. The City Manager may delegate these 
responsibilities to the Assistant City Manager, The City Manager or Assistant City 
Manager, as authorized, shall administer the personnel system provided by this personnel 
policy pursuant to approved rules and regulations and applicable law. 
2 of 2 3001 
ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 13 
Layton City Policy Manual 
1 [Policy] APPEALS/GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES 1 
[Subject Area] Personnel 
[Action] New 
J Revision of # P-90-2, 3401, 3802 
Previously Effective 3-19-90,9-1-93, 
1 4-5-94, 12-05-95 
[Type] Administrative Policy 
Personnel Policy 
Finance Policy s 
[Approval Signature & Title] ll S7i 
[Effective Date] 
February 12, 1996 
[No.] 1 
3802 1 
[Distribution] City-Wide 1X1 
Dept Heads D 
Department D 
D Risk Management D 
SI Form U 
1 D 1 
§ms~^ ^ M a n a g e r ] 
[Pages] 
5 | 
T 
Appeals/Greivances Not Involving Termination or Transfer Discipline 
If a Layton City employee wishes to appeal a performance evaluation, disciplinary action, or 
register a grievance, the supervisor should instruct the employee in the following procedures: 
1. A written notification of appeal must be filed with the Department Director within 5 
working days of the interview for the performance evaluation, disciplinary action or 
grievance, except as described in Paragraph 7. 
In cases involving the appeal of a performance evaluation, this notification should state 
the specific reason(s) why the appraisal is being appealed. 
2. The Department Director will meet with the supervisor and with the employee separately 
to discuss the appeal and obtain relevant information. 
3. The Department Director will then determine if the appeal has merit. 
4. If the Department Director determines that the appeal does have merit, a meeting will be 
held with the employee, the supervisor, the Department Director, and the Personnel 
Department to discuss an appropriate resolution to the situation. 
5. If the Department Director determines that the appeal does not have merit, the employee 
will be informed, in writing, of the Department Director's decision. Written notification 
of denial of an appeal will be made within fifteen working days from the time the original 
written appeal was filed. 
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6. If the employee wishes to pursue the appeal further, the employee may file a written 
notice of appeal with the City Manager within five working days from the time he 
received notice that the original appeal was officially denied. The City Manager will 
then review the facts of the situation, interview the involved parties, and make a written 
determination regarding the appeal within fifteen working days. 
7. If an employee's supervisor is a Department Director, the written appeal may be filed 
directly with the City Manager within five working days of the interview for the 
performance evaluation, disciplinary action or grievance. The Department Director will 
then be notified of the appeal and the City Manager will handle the appeal process in 
place of the Department Director, as outlined in Numbers 2 through 5 above. The City 
Manager's decision on an appeal will be final. 
Appeals of Termination or Transfer to a Position of Less Remuneratiop 
(See chapter 2.55 of the Lay ton City Municipal Code) 
Right of Appeal 
No appointive officer or employee covered by Section 10-3-1105 U.C. A. shall be discharged 
or transferred to a position with less remuneration because of his or her politics or religious 
beliefs, or incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers, governing body or 
heads of departments. In all cases where an appointive officer or regular full time employee, 
other than the City Manager and heads of departments, is discharged or transferred to a 
position with less remuneration for any reason, the officer or regular full time employee shall 
have the right to appeal such discharge or transfer in accordance with this chapter. 
Appeal Procedure 
All administrative appeals shall be processed according to the following procedure: 
(1) The appeal shall be taken by filing a written notice of such appeal with the personnel 
director within ten days after discharge or transfer. Upon filing of such appeal, the 
personnel director shall forthwith refer a copy of the same to said appeal board. Upon 
receipt of the referral from the personnel director, the appeal board shall forthwith 
commence its investigation, take and receive evidence, and fully hear and determine the 
matter which relates to the cause for such discharge or transfer,, 
(2) The officer or employee shall be entitled to appear in person and to be represented by 
counsel, to have a public hearing, to confront any witness whose testimony is to be 
considered, to call witnesses, and to examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal 
board. 
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(3) In the event the appeal board upholds the discharge or transfer, the officer or employee 
may have fourteen days thereafter to appeal to the City Manager whose decision shall be 
final. 
(4) In the event the appeal board does not uphold the discharge or transfer, then the 
supervisor or department head may have fourteen days thereafter to appeal to the 
governing body of the city whose decision shall be final after hearing the evidence in the 
same manner as provided for in the appeal to the appeal board. 
Appeal Board 
There is hereby created an appeal board to consist of five members, two of whom shall be 
members of the governing body and three of whom shall be chosen by and from the 
appointive officers and employees of the city. 
Selection of Board Members 
The city recorder will give notice that applications and nominations are being accepted for 
the appeal board. Any officer or employee may apply or may nominate another officer or 
employee. The city recorder shall establish a reasonable notice procedure and time period 
for this process. All people nominated will be notified and given an opportunity to accept 
the nomination or withdraw their name from consideration. At the end of the applica-
tion/nomination period the city recorder shall forward all remaining names to the City 
Manager. The members of the appeal board shall be selected through an election which shall 
be conducted by the city recorder and which allows all appointive officers and regular full 
time employees of the city an opportunity to cast a vote. In addition to the three appointive 
officers and regular full time employees elected to the board, alternate members shall also 
be elected to serve on the board in the event of an absence or if a conflict of interest should 
arise involving another board member. 
Election of Board Members 
The City Manager shall present the names of five officers or employees to be considered by 
the general body of employees of Lay ton City 4o sit on the appeal board. These names shall 
be given to the city recorder. After receiving the names, the city recorder shall then prepare 
a ballot for the election of said appeal board members. Votes shall be cast, either yes or no, 
in favor of each individual nominee by the city employees. If all are affirmed the City 
Manager will determine which members are to be the alternates. If any are not affirmed, by 
receiving yes votes totaling less than 50% of the votes cast, the City Manager shall present 
an additional name or names, in a number equivalent to those not affirmed, for a second 
election process. The two board members to be chosen from the governing body shall be 
appointed by the mayor. 
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Conflict of Interest 
No member of the appeal board shall hear an appeal from the department in which the 
member is employed or administers. Nor shall a member hear an appeal in which the member 
is related to the appealing employee through blood or marriage. For purposes of this section, 
related persons shall include and be limited to: father, mother, husband, wife, son, daughter, 
sister, brother, uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, first cousin, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-
in-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law or daughter-in-law. 
Vacancy on the Board 
If a vacancy occurs on the board the member shall be replaced by the first alternate board 
member in the case of an appointed officer or employee. The City Manager shall then 
present a name for the election process. This newest member then becomes the second 
alternate. 
In the case of a vacancy by a member of the governing body, the mayor shall appoint a 
replacement for the remainder of the term. 
No Compensation for Board Members 
Members of the appeal board shall receive no compensation for services. 
Quorum 
Three or more members of the appeals board shall constitute a quorum sufficient to hear 
appeals. 
Board Decisions 
The decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall be certified to the 
personnel director within fifteen days from the date the matter is referred to it. The board 
may, in its decision, provide that an employee shall receive his/her salary for the period of 
time during which he is discharged, or any deficiency in salary for the period he was 
transferred to a position of less remuneration but not to exceed a fifteen day period. In no 
case shall the appointive officer or employee be discharged or transferred, where an appeal 
is taken, except upon a concurrence of the City Manager. 
Counting Board Ballots 
After balloting, the decision shall be counted, and revealed in the presence of the same 
members that voted. A simple majority of quorum voting will determine the decision. A 
member may not abstain from voting. The voting shall be limited to upholding or reversing 
the decision before the board on appeal. 
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Board Reverses Decision and Employee Salary 
In the event that the appeal board does not uphold the discharge or transfer to a position of 
less remuneration, the recorder shall certify the decision to the employee affected, and also 
to the head of the department from whose order the appeal was taken. The employee shall 
be paid his salary, commencing with the next working day following the certification by the 
recorder of the appeal boards decision, provided that the employee, or officer concerned, 
reports for his assigned duties during that next working day. 
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